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Abstract:   
Research aims: Central and local governments are trying to curbing fraud 
involving the village government apparatus (APD) by increasing the remuneration 
of APD, so that they are not tempted to misuse the village fund that they manage. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The purpose of this study is to see whether 
remuneration is the cause of fraud, the extent to which the application of new 
PPE remuneration has an impact on reducing the potential for fraud and who is 
the main actor in fraud. This research uses a qualitative approach, and case study 
strategy research. The research was carried out in in three villages within a 
district, Regency of Barito Kuala, South Kalimantan. Data were collected through 
several relevant informants interviewed using the open-ended questions 
technique. 
Research findings:  The results of this study indicate that APD is required to be 
professional to carry out their duties in managing village development, but on the 
other hand, the compensation for workload received is not commensurate with 
the risks faced. However, the increase in remuneration for the APD is only 
happened to the village head and village secretary, while the head of affairs and 
head of section’s renumeration remain below regional standard pay (UMR). The 
main cause of fraud is in the aspect of hegemony power and governance. 
Theoretical contribution/ Originality: The new remuneration system is supposed 
to curb the potential fraud, however, it leaves new loopholes for committing 
fraud. The paper suggests the new renumeration system needs to be revamped, 
in which all APD should receive minimum pay at UMR level, Improved 
governance, encouraging community participation and eliminating stereotypes 
about power as an effort to achieve prosperity.  
Research limitation/Implication: This research was conducted using a qualitative 
approach where the results of this study cannot be generalized to a wider scope. 
Keywords: Village Fund; Fraud; Apparatus Renumeration 
Introduction 
Villages need to be developed to reduce the gap with cities by maximizing 
the potential management and characteristics of each area. Law Number 
6 of 2014 mandates the central government to provide at least 10% of the 
State Budget as village funds. This law was made to align villages to 
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The strengthening and manifestation of villages to become independent through laws 
place villages as the governance and development subject that departs from a bottom-
up position. After the distribution of funds to villages, many regions carried out the 
expansion, and several regions proposed a status change from "kelurahan” (urban 
village) to “desa” (village).  These activities were carried out to acquire funds (Okezone 
News, 2017). In 2016, the number of villages increased from 74,093 in 2015 to 74,754. 
Furthermore, in 2017, there was an increase by 200, thereby culminating in 74,954 with 
a budget allocation of 60 trillion rupiahs (DitjendPDT, 2017). 
 
The quality and quantity associated with the roles and responsibilities accepted by the 
village have not been accompanied by adequate human resources (HR) due to 
inadequate broad authority and understanding related to the principles of funds self-
management (IP03;IP04, 2017). Furthermore, they do not have procedures, facilities, 
and infrastructure to support financial management both in terms of income and 
expenditure budgets (Sofyani, Suryanto, Wibowo, & Widiastuti, 2018). APD has a high 
criminalization risk considering the number of funds that the government needs to 
manage. The rampant criminalization of village heads due to their ignorance and poor 
governance is one of their problems (Kompas, 2018; Republika, 2017). 
 
 Fraud is an act against the law, which is deliberately carried out by people inside or 
outside an organization for personal or group benefits, directly or indirectly harming 
other parties (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2016). Examples of fraud include 
manipulation or giving statements, false reports against other parties, etc. This illegal 
activity is divided into corruption, asset misappropriation, and fraudulent statements, as 
shown in Figure 1. The tempo online news stated that the Marabahan District Attorney, 
Barito Kuala Regency, South Kalimantan, has conducted an investigation into corruption 
allegations in the village funds allocation at Pindahan Baru, Rantau Badauh Subdistrict. 
In 2015, the alleged corruption related to the construction of roads, village culverts, 
security posts, and procurement of bikro stones was worth 500 million rupiah (Tempo, 
2016). 
 
Furthermore, in 2017, the Village Head of Sungai Rasau, Cerbon Subdistrict, Barito Kuala 
Regency (Batola), had to face the law for alleged corruption in the Village Income and 
Expenditure Budget (APB) amounting to IDR 367,400,429  (Klikkalsel, 2019; Kumparan, 
2018). This incident indicates the high risk faced by village fund managers and illustrates 
that there are 2 (two) types of management, namely becoming a resident of a "prodeo 
hotel" or being prosperous, with a questionable APD welfare. In early 2018, a petition 
was addressed to the President of Indonesia, driven by one of the APD that is also a 
member of the Indonesian Village Apparatus Association (PPDI) on the change.org 
website. The petition highlighted that the welfare in terms of remuneration, received by 
APD is not proportional to the job demands. 
 
Welfare is a central issue associated with several success stories of village funds. 
According to studies, Switzerland has succeeded in becoming the third corrupt-free 
country after several decades due to the proper utilization of its welfare resources. The 
country was selected in-line with Finland with a score of 85, followed by Denmark and 
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New Zealand in second and first places with scores of 88 and 89, respectively 
(Transparency International, 2018). In the 17th and 18th centuries, Sweden was known 
as the most corrupt country in Europe, however after implementing an initial increase in 
remuneration of their civil servants, there was a balance with regulations, which turned 
the country into a corrupt-free nation within two decades (Kornai, Haggard, & Kaufman, 
2001). 
 
The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) likens corruption in this country to a 
“forbidden inheritance” without wills. Furthermore, Syahroni, Maharso, and Sujarwadi, 
(2018) stated that corruption is a culture that tends to remain sustainable and preserved 
despite claims that it is forbidden by regulations in each ruling regime. Corruption 
affects every aspect of Indonesia's life due to internal and external factors. Some of the 
internal factors include weak faith, honesty, shame, corrupt attitudes, or behavior 
(Corruption Eradication Commission, 2015). External factors are determined from 
economic aspects such as inadequate income, political interests that lead to instability, 
and the process of gaining and maintaining power. This is in addition to the poor 
management and organizations due to the poor form of legislation, weak law 
enforcement, as well as social aspects such as the environment or society that does not 
support anti-corruption behavior (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 2015). 
 
The basic idea that promotes the increasing wages policy as an effort to mitigate fraud 
comes from Becker and Stigler (1974), according to them, an increase in the civil 
servant's wages above the official salary, encourages them be honest. Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder, (2001) also stated that an increase in welfare (salary) has a significant effect 
in decreasing corruption. This assumption underlines the statement that high 
government official salaries reduce corruption (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2007; Liu & 
Lin, 2012; Pellegrini, 2011). It also supports the research carried out by Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2014), which stated that there is a relationship between welfare and a 
decrease in corruption due to various conditions during auditing.  
 
According to (Gong & Wu, 2012) the low remuneration rate of government officials, 
with high service expectations, leads to an illegal and informal increase in corruption. 
The findings show no relationship between high government official salaries and a 
decrease in corruption (Gong & Wu, 2012). This is in line with the research carried out 
by Abbink, (2002); Rauch and Evans, (2000); Treisman, (2000). Furthermore, there are 
still mixed studies related to remuneration, and some still show doubts, irrespective of 
their ability to explain the close relationship between welfare and fraud. The research 
associated with welfare/remuneration/salary is still limited, especially in the context of 
public sector institutions at the village government level. Oktavia, Sayekti, and Prasetyo 
(2018) research showed a negative effect on fraud compensation in Pasirian Subdistrict, 
Lumajang Regency. Therefore, based on the phenomenon related to the issue of 
welfare/remuneration/compensation and the large responsibility borne by the Village 
Government Apparatus (APD), research related to this topic becomes interesting to 
explore. Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, and Riley Jr (2013) also suggested an 
understanding of compensation's role in relation to fraud mitigation. 
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This study differs from Oktavia et al., (2018) research because it specifically examines 
the causes of fraud based on the fraud theory in accordance with Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs and hegemony. This research extracted direct information from informants on the 
tendency to commit fraud and the benefits of village funds related to remuneration 
issues for APD. Therefore, the research focuses on whether remuneration is the cause of 
fraud and how the implementation of new APD impacts reducing its potential and the 
main actor. According to Blackburn, Bose, and Haque (2011), economic pressures 
contribute to the occurrence of fraudulent behavior. Perpetrators of fraud perceive their 
wages to be incompatible with their work. Furthermore, bureaucrats with less wages 
expect to receive compensation through some form of malpractice (Blackburn et al., 
2011). 
 
The government has issued priority for the yearly utilization of village funds to minimize 
fraud. This program is achievable when all factors involved participate in building the 
village as a form of equitable development in accordance with Law No. 6, 2014, 
including the vital role of APD. The analysis results can be used for various decision-
makers to determine the risk and return conditions received by APD in managing village 
funds, and potential (loophole). This research is also expected to act as an additional 
literature review on the potential factors that lead to fraud, particularly in terms of the 







According to Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, and Zimbelman (2015):  
 
"fraud is a generic term and embraces all the multifarious means which human can 
ingenuity devise. It is defined as the process adopted by an individual to get an advantage 
over another by false representations. No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as 
a general proposition in defining fraud, this is because it includes surprise, trickery, 
cunning, and unfair ways by which another is cheated. The only boundaries defining it are 
those which limit human knavery”.  
 
According to Tuanakotta, (2010), fraud includes various actions against the law, which 
can be overcome by prevention and detection. Several theories such as the CDMA 
developed by Klitgaard, the fraud triangle developed by Donald R Cressy, the willingness 
and opportunity for corruption, the perpetrator motivation, the cost-benefit model, and 
the gone theory put forward by Jack Bologne, stated that the causes of fraud are 
negligence, opportunity, rationalisation, and capability. Vousinas, (2019) developed a 
fraud hexagone which stated that collusion is another factor that causes fraud. 
Therefore, it becomes a stimulus, capability, collusion, opportunity, rationalization, and 
ego, abbreviated as S.C.C.O.R.E. The elements of hexagone fraud can also be used as an 
analytical tool to determine causes of fraud. Vousinas, (2019) stated that collusion can 
be used to determine the factors causing white-collar crimes such as fraud in the 
corruption section. 
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Types of Fraud 
 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2016) schematically divides fraud as 




Figure 1 Fraud Tree 
Source: Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2019) 
 
The fraud tree illustrates the main branches of fraud, such as corruption, asset 
misappropriation, and fraudulent statements. 
 
Hegemony Theory  
 
Hegemony literally means "leadership" and it is also used by political commentators to 
denote domination. Politically, hegemony means that self or group is better than others, 
therefore it becomes a desire to dominate because it feels worthy. According to Gramsci 
(1971) in Prison Notebooks "the ability of hegemony to undoubtedly presuppose the 
interests of groups leads to corporate-economic sacrifices." The public sector at the 
village government level shows that as a group of hegemonic institutions, the main 
objective of maintaining consensus and dominance in the society is to ensure a social 
group is obtained (Goddard, 2002). 
 
Syarifuddin (2011) stated that hegemony can be shown in the power configuration, and 
budget policy changes, therefore, the policy-making process needs to be more oriented 
to the public. Furthermore, in terms of the issue of basic needs, the leader receives 
comprehensive support from the people (political power). On the other hand, this 
research also proves that the actors' ability to identify problems is also power or a 
power source.  
 
Hierarchy of Need Theory  
 
The famous psychologist Abraham Maslow proposed a theory of motivation based on 
universal human needs. Maslow believes that every individual has a hierarchy of needs, 
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consisting of physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, and self-actualization needs, as 
shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs 
Source: Maslow, (1943) illustrated by Gitman, McDaniel, Shah, Reece, Koffel, Talsma, 
and Hyatt (2018) and Wang, (2018) 
 
Maslow's theory of motivation indicates that people search for jobs to fulfill their basic 
needs, such as food, shelter, and clothing (Gitman et al., 2018). When they are able to 
provide these basic needs for themselves and families, they are in the physical and 
safety needs level of the hierarchy. According to Gitman et al., (2018) people need to 
feel safe, protected from physical harm, and avoid the unexpected, therefore, they need 
job security and protection from occupational hazards before trying to move up to the 
next step in order to reach the peak level, known as self-actualization. 
 
Law No. 6 of 2014 
 
Law Number 6 of 2014 mandates the government to allocate Village Funds to support 
the implementation of duties and functions for adequate development according to 
authority. The fund is budgeted annually in the State Budget, which is given to each 
village as a source of income. This policy simultaneously integrates and optimizes all 
existing budget allocation schemes from the government to villages, in accordance with 
Law No. 6 of 2014.  
 
According to Hamzah (2015), funds sourced from the State Budget (APBN) and allocated 
to villages are transferred through the State General Treasury Account to the Regional 
Revenue and Expenditure Budget through the Regional General Treasury Account. The 
Village Fund is used to finance governance, public development, and community 
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Welfare/Remuneration based on Law no. 6 of 2014 
 
Based on the Regulation of the Minister for Administrative Reform and Bureaucratic 
State Apparatus Number 20 of 2010 regarding the Bureaucratic Reform Road Map, the 
2010/2014 remuneration is defined as follows.  
 
“Remuneration is all forms of compensation received by employees for their contribution 
to the organization. It is flexible, can be direct or indirect, cash or non-cash, with the 
provision of regular or basic salary, allowances, and other benefits."  
 
APD welfare is regulated in Law no. 6 of 2014, where the central government provides 
fixed income, allowances, and incentives sourced from ADD (Village Fund Allocation) 
and managed by Regency. Since the enactment of the village law, APD salaries and 
allowances have been regulated in more detail by each region's regent, which refers to 
Government Regulations no 43 of 2014 concerning Guidelines. This is also associated 
with the implementation of Law No.6 of 2014 concerning villages, therefore the amount 
varies depending on the regent decision in each region. In 2019, the amount of APD 
Fixed Income was regulated with a minimum limit based on Government Regulation 
Number 11 of 2019 and in accordance with the Second Amendment to Government 
Regulation Number 43 of 2014 concerning Regulations of Law Implementation Number 
6 of 2014. 
 
The Role of Village Officials in Law no. 6 of 2014 on the management of village funds  
 
The village's official roles and responsibilities have tremendously changed since the 
issuance of Village Law No. 6/2014. Prior to this law, many villages did not have physical 
buildings, such as offices, therefore activities were carried out at the village head's 
house. As changes occured, APD was required to be more committed to managing 
village affairs, especially in terms of time. According to the report, many village officials 
felt burdened at the beginning of the new law enactment in the Barito Kuala Regency 
and all regions in Indonesia (Kompak, 2016). The village head is mandated to carry out 
important roles in accordance with the Village Law no. 6 of 2014. Furthermore, the 
village secretary’s administrative and accountability role increases due to changes in 
regulations.  
 
Generally, village officials believe that they have little information with great demands 
that are not matched with their background and qualifications, which leads to numerous 
administrative errors (ID02, 2018). The role of the Village Head, which is important in 
terms of management, is limited by the energy spent in responding to requests from the 
communities. Therefore, they need to have the ability to carry out the managerial role, 
and this is also considered natural to the community. 
 
In accordance with Law No.6 of 2014, the Village Consultative Agency (BPD) plays a role 
as an internal control in village government activities in managing funds. However, in 
this progress, the role and authority are unclear due to the various views of the BPD 
role, which led to conflicts. 
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Research Method 
 
Types of research 
 
This is a qualitative research, with a case study approach used to identify local specific 
phenomena (Mahmudi, 2003), interplay of social settings where research was carried 
out (Hudaya, Smark, Watts, & Silaen, 2015) and its implications to the policies made 
(Mahmudi, 2003). The research was conducted in Barito Kuala Regency, which is an 
underdeveloped subdistrict with an underdeveloped village index from 2015 to 2020, as 
shown in Table 1. 
 
Three out of five villages in Subdistrict A were the object of in-depth observation in 
Barito Kuala Regency with coding used as the research object to maintain information 
confidentiality. This research was carried out from October 2017 to July 2019. Table 1 
shows the information regarding the villages as the research objects. 
 





Village Status  
2016 2017 2019 
1 A OD01 Developing Developing Developed 
2 A OD02 Underdeveloped Developing Developing 
3 A OD03 Very underdeveloped Underdeveloped Underdeveloped 
Source: Ministry of Village, 2019 
 
This study started by carrying out field research through initial observations and 
interviews with officials in OD01 and OD02 villages. Furthermore, the snowball sampling 
technique was used to determine informants’ competence, good knowledge, and 
credibility in answering any questions posed in the interview. 
 
Table 2 Informants or Key Informants 





Potential for Village 
Fund Fraud  







Face to face interview, 
through phone and 
whatapps, transect 





a. Study of the 
Village Funds and 
Utilization in 
South Kalimantan 
b. Potential for 













Potential for Village 
Fund Fraud  





Interview and FGD ID (informant at village 
level) with code  W 
given to distinguish 
villagers from village 
government 
apparatus. 
Total Informant 25 
people  
  
Source: processed by the author, 2018 
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The key informants were the Village Head, Secretary, and the Head of the Village 
Consultative Agency. Furthermore, data were obtained from village officials, community 
leaders, and related institutions such as Financial and Development Supervisory Agency 
(BPKP), Village Community Empowerment (PMD), Service Personnel, and Inspectorate. 
Table 2 shows the details of the informant data:   
 
Data collection technique  
 
Data were collected through transect, observation, interviews, and focus group 
discussions (FGD) with permission from the relevant agencies and informants. 
Interviews were carried out in a structured and unstructured manner through 
documentation, while FGDs were conducted at the beginning of the research to explore 
issues related to village funds. 
 
The use of interview and FGD techniques in the data collection method depended on 
the informants' time availability, followed by documentation and transect in a way that 
is considered appropriate and relevant in assessing rural environmental conditions. 
Sources of evidence in the form of documents are also obtained from agencies, 
informants, and related parties, in the form of recorded interviews, archives, resumes, 
and direct observation.  
 
Data analysis technique  
 
According to Yin, (2018) data analysis is the process of categorizing, tabulating, and 
combining evidence to refer to the initial proposition of a study. Furthermore, it is a 
filter for disconfirming evidence or deviance. Creswell and Creswell, (2018) highlighted 
that triangulation process in qualitative research is needed to enhance reliability and 




Figure 3 Illustration of the triangulation process 
Source: referring to Creswell and Creswell, (2018) 
 
According to Yin, (2018), there are five analysis techniques for the case study approach, 
namely pattern matching, building explanations, time series analysis, logic models, and 
cross-case synthesis. This research uses pattern matching techniques to analyze the 
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problem under study and answer questions regarding the research objectives. Sinkovics, 
(2018) stated that pattern matching involves comparing the predicted theoretical 
pattern with the observed empirical pattern. The underlying assumption is that humans 
understand the world by comparing their external observation with the model patterns, 
which also exists to some degree in cases where the pattern match is not explicit. 
Similarly, applying pattern-matching logic causes a more rigorous as well as structured 
research and writing process. Gerring, (2017); Marshall and Rossman, (2016) highlighted 
the importance data reduction over data gathered before pattern matching analysis was 
conducted. Data reduction process helped researchers in sorting out the relevant data 
processed in pattern matching analysis. We then theorized the research process and 
















Figure 4 Research Process and Pattern Matching 
Source: developed from Gerring, (2017); Marshall and Rossman, (2016); Sinkovics, 
(2018); Yin, (2018) 
 
The pattern matching process is divided into three steps or practical phases, namely 
stating a research proposition (when needed), examining the empirically found patterns 
of each different method against the predicted ones, and providing theoretical 
explanations with research results (Yin, 2015). 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
Before presenting the results, it is necessary to reemphasize that this study aims to 
determine the factors that cause fraud and the relationship with the remuneration 
received by the village government Apparatus  (APD). The results stated that the 
research was divided into exposure to fraud cases in Barito Kuala Regency, with the APD 









The pattern found is not 
in accordance with the 
predicted/preposition 
pattern. 
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Fraud Case in Barito Kuala Regency 
 
From 2015 to early 2020, there were 4 cases of fraud/corruption in village funds at 
Barito Kuala Regency, as shown in tables 3 and 4.   
 
Table 3 Ongoing fraud (corruption) cases 
No. Village Defendant Subdistrict Case Development 
1. Pulau Sugara 
Village. 
Village head Alalak Banjarmasin District 
Court Session 
2. Sungai Seluang 
Village 
Village head Belawang Banjarmasin District 
Court Session 
Souce: (Banjarmasinpost, 2020b, 2020a) 
 
Table 4 Fraud (Corruption) cases that have received a verdict 
No. Village  Convict Decision   
1. Pindahan Baru 
Village, Rantau 
Badauh Subdistrict  
H Bunyamin, 
Village head 
With a legal force No. 8/pid.sus-
tpk/2017/pn.bjm 




With a legal force No 12/Pid.Sus-
TPK/2019/PN. 
Bjm. 
Souce: Indonesian Directory of Supreme Court Decisions, 2019 
 
The tables show that there are a total of 4 cases with 2 having received final legal 
decisions (inkracht van gewijsde), while the remaining 2 are undergoing trial. 
 
Mapping of APD Welfare in Barito Kuala Subdistrict 
 
Members of APD and their families have been worried about their welfare since the 
Village Law enactment. This encouraged them to carry out demands and commitments 
for long working hours. Initially, working as village officials were voluntary because most 
APD had businesses or other jobs to support them.  
 
APD welfare in Indonesia is currently based on the amount of money received, which 
widely varies (Kompak, 2016).  Based on the Reality Checking Approach on Local 
Perspectives and Experiences towards the Village Law Indonesia in early 2016, 70% of 
ADD was used to pay for APD welfare, with a village secretary paid with civil salary scale 
servants appointed directly by the regent. The APD welfare in Indonesia and especially 
for Barito Kuala Subdistrict, is measured by the provision of salaries, allowances, and 
incentives as shown in table 5. 
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Table 5 APD remuneration in 2016 
No Description 
(Position) 

























VILLAGE GOVERNMENT APPARATUS  (APD) 
1. Village head Rp. 2,500,000,- * Rp. 2,085,050,- Rp. 2,800,000,- * Rp. 2,258,000,- Rp. 5,100,000,- * Rp. 2,651,781,- 
2. Village Secretary Rp  1,770,000,- **  Rp. 2,010,000,- **  Rp. 3,620,000,- *  
3. Head of Affairs Rp. 1,300,000,- **  Rp. 1,500,000,- **  Rp. 2,650,000,- **  
4. Head of Division Rp. 1,300,000,- **  Rp. 1,500,000,- **  Rp. 2,650,000,- **  
5. Village 
Treasurer 
Rp.    900,000,- **  Rp. 1,250,000,- **  Rp. 2,350,000,- **  
6. Asset Treasurer    Rp. 1,000,000,- **  Rp. 2,100,000,- **  
VILLAGE CONSULTATIVE AGENCY (BPD) 
1. Chairman Rp.    400,000,- ** Rp. 2,085,050,- Rp.    500,000,- ** Rp. 2,258,000,- Rp.    500,000,- ** Rp. 2,651,781,- 
2. Vice Chairman Rp.    350,000,- **  Rp.    450,000,- **  Rp.    500,000,- **  
3. Secretary Rp.    350,000,- **  Rp.    450,000,- **  Rp.    500,000,- **  
4. Member Rp.    300,000,- **  Rp.    400,000,- **  Rp.    450,000,- **  
Neighborhood (RT) and Hamlet  (RW) 
1. Neighborhood Rp.    150,000,- ** Rp. 2,085,050,- Rp.    150,000,- ** Rp. 2,258,000,- Rp.    150,000,- ** Rp. 2,651,781,- 
2. Hamlet  Rp.    150,000,- **  Rp.    150,000,- **  Rp.    150,000,- **  
 
Notes:  for categories above the Regional Minimum Wage (UMR), is given with an * sign and for below the UMR is given with an **  sign 
Source: Barito Kuala Regency Regent Regulation Number 54 of 2015  
Yuliastina, Hudaya, Nor, & Ainun 
New Remuneration System for Village Government Apparatus (APD): … 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Investment, 2021 | 13 
Law No.6 2014 was the starting point of the implementation and disbursement of village 
funds in 2016. The APD welfare is still below the UMR for Barito Kuala Regency, except 
for the village head. In 2016, Barito Kuala had 195 villages with 16, 147, 32, and 0 
villages underdeveloped, underdeveloped, developing, and developed. The welfare 
conditions (remuneration) for PPE in 2017 were also the same in all the villages. 
However, based on IDM, 13, 125, 53, and 4 villages were very underdeveloped, 
underdeveloped, developing, and developed in 2017. This means that there is status 
progress in 46 villages, while 127 are still with the same status and 20 decreased when 
compared to IDM data in 2016. 
 
APD remuneration in 2018 significantly increased, as shown from the salaries of village 
heads and secretaries that far exceeded the UMR for Barito Kuala Regency. Heads of 
affairs and divisions are still in the lower limit, however the value is not significant with 
the remuneration received by the village and asset treasurer below the UMR. This needs 
to be a concern because the village and asset treasurer are in direct contact with 
financial management and similar to BPD's amount, which is 1/5 of the UMR. In the end, 
it can be concluded that the total amount received by APD, especially in the top village 
management, gradually increases yearly. 
 
This increase in value is because the obtained nominals obtained have far exceeded the 
UMR, especially for the Village Head. However, based on the APD statement, village 
heads spend many funds to fulfill their constituencies (ID02, 2018). The village head also 
plays the role of protecting the community, and it is not uncommon for them to attend 
weddings, funerals, and other events, therefore they need funds for these activities 
which are not obtained from the village budget. 
 
In 2019, the village head's regular income was Rp. 2,426,640, or equivalent to 120% of 
class II/a civil servant’s salary. Meanwhile, the village secretary's regular income was at 
least Rp. 2,224,420, or equivalent to 110% of class II /a civil servant’s salary. 
Furthermore, the other village officials' regular income is at least Rp. 2,022,200, or 
equivalent to 100% of class II/a civil servant’s salary. These are based on the government 
Regulation Number 11 of 2019, the second amendment  Regulation Number 43 of 2014, 
and Regulations for Law Implementation Number 6 of 2014 on Villages. In addition, the 
district/city minimum wage (UMK) set for Barito Kuala Regency in 2019 is Rp. 2.6 million 
rupiahs. 
 
The APD remuneration distribution depends on the village funds allocation (ADD) from 
the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget with the regentregent's policies. 
Although the amount earned has gradually increased, there are indeed several position 
levels that receive salaries, allowances, and incentives under the legislation provisions 
(Labor Law). Furthermore, APD welfare/remuneration increases when juxtaposed with 
the village welfare represented by the Developing Village Index (IDM). Table 6 describes 
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Table 6 Description of Village Status Development in Barito Kuala Regency 2016-2019 
Independent Developed Developing Underdeveloped Very 
Underdeveloped 
2016 2020 2016 2020 2016 2020 2016 2020 2016 2020 
0 1 0 8 32 133 147 51 16 2 
Source: Developing Village Index, 2020 
 
Overall, since the village fund's existence, the number of underdeveloped areas in Barito 
Kuala Regency has drastically decreased for 4 years. When related to the APD role and 
welfare, it is also very impactful with the Village Law's existence and the regulation of 
roles with a gradual change in welfare. 
 
GAP of Village Government Apparatus  Welfare/Remuneration 
 
Welfare/remuneration between position levels in different organizations creates gaps 
 
 
Figure 5 The new APD remuneration system creates a welfare gap (remuneration 
received) 
 
Figure 5 shows that the remuneration at the top management level is above the 
Indonesian Law standards Number 13 of 2003 concerning Manpower. Furthermore, the 
welfare gap can turn into a potential fraud gap in APD's motivation to fulfill basic needs. 
 
 
Figure 6 Pattern Matching: The welfare gap promotes the emergence of a potential 
fraud gap 
 Remuneration for 
Head of Village 








Remuneration for Head 
of Village Affairs and 
Divisions 
Regional Minimum Wage 
(UMR) 
Below Regional 
Minimum Wage (UMR) 
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The pattern in figure 6 shows that there are loopholes (gaps) in the village government 
apparatus (APD) remuneration system, therefore, they need to ensure that all APD 
receive a monthly income, similar to the UMR standard. Furthermore, when the APD is 
still struggling to live properly at a minimum, it is inappropriate for the government to 
demand that they fight to bring prosperity to their village residents. On the other hand, 
APD is also involved in managing village funds, which leads them into the temptation of 
utilizing it for their personal needs.  
 
Village Government Apparatus Profession: High Risk, Low Return? 
 
People work for various reasons, such as earning some money, facing challenges, and 
gaining security. Therefore, organizations need to decide what people need in a 
workplace and ensure they play an essential role in motivating them. APD, as a worker, 
needs to have a certain motivation at work in order to fulfil their levels and hierarchy of 
needs (Maslow, 1943). Therefore, the following is an excerpt from participants in the 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) on the Study of the Village Funds Utilization in South 
Kalimantan (2018) “Village heads do have great potential to carried out misuse due to 
their power.” According to the hegemony theory by Gramsci (1971), the power 
possessed by the village head plays a vital role in development, in accordance with Law 
No. 6 of 2014, which requires the principle of self-management. Villages are built 
together by the community and for the community. 
 
The potential for criminalization is also high due to the ignorance of correct 
administrative handling and the large funds that need to be managed by the village 
government. Based on a statement from the Provincial Assistant Coordinating Officer, 
one of the Village Heads in Barito Kuala Regency had problems with 300 million-rupiah 
funds and is currently held as a fugitive (IP06, 2018). The same information was also 
disclosed by a village official in Barito Kuala Regency in the following excerpt. 
 
"In Regency Barito Kuala, a Village Head was tried in court and is still in the appeal process 
from OD05. There are indications of administrative falsification starting from meetings, 
with nepotism indications for implementing family-related work, fictitious projects, and 
mark-ups." (ID02, 2018)  
 
In Village OD05, there was a fraud case where the Village Head and family were the 
dominant actors involved in using the Village Fund. Generally, and based on many 
studies and literature, fraud occurs a lot due to pressure in terms of financial, 
opportunity, rationalization, ego, stimulus, capability and collution. However, in 
hegemony, the village head's full power is one of the potential causes of fraud.   
 
Village funds provided by the central government are the main reasons behind the 
participation of several parties in elections. The village head is seen as a symbol of the 
highest social sovereignty and the landlady communities directly or indirectly with them. 
According to a statement released by an official in a village of Barito Kuala Regency 
(2018),  
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“Since the distribution of funds in 2015, which is approximately 1 billion rupiahs, many 
people have become interested in becoming village heads." (IK05, 2018) 
 
Full power is associated with the fraud theory, which fulfils opportunity, ego, stimulus, 
and capability.  
 
The competition for Village Heads creates high political costs, with some parties still 
have the wrong perception of village funds because the majority considers its 
operational costs. Furthermore, the high political costs cause problems in the future. 
Officials that win elections using money always use the opportunity to return the initial 
capital used for winning (ID02, 2018), thereby creating collusion during the process. This 
is in line with (Kompak, 2016) regarding the Reality Checking Approach on Local 
Perspectives and Experiences towards the Village Law in Indonesia 2016. 
 
One of the villages, used as an object for in-depth research experienced  high political 
costs during elections, different from the winning party that served for two periods 
(ID02, 2018). Due to the defeat, the losing party attacked the incumbent government 
with news in the form of fraud cases. The news obtained into the local media, and after 
proper analysis, it turned out that it was carried out by the political opponents that lost 
the election. The practice of cultural hegemony also occurs in this area where a group of 
people wants to maintain power in various ways and this is resolved by clarification 
(ID02, 2018). 
 
Financial pressure, such as high political costs due to the village head election, is the 
main reason for fraud. The power of the Village Head as the Financial Management 
Power Holder (PKPKD) creates potential opportunities for fraud. According to the 
Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 20/2018 the authority delegation to village 
secretaries and officials act as Regional Financial Management Officers (PPKD) for the 
prevention of fraud associated with Village Funds. Therefore, the village officials in 
Barito Kuala District stated the following: 
 
“In the previous regulation, PPKD was absolutely the village head responsibility, and with 
the issuance of new regulations enacted in 2019, the role was delegated to the Village 
Secretary, therefore the Village Head and the Secretary worked together.”(ID02, 2018) 
 
This regulation became effective in 2019, thereby leading to changes in the Minister of 
Home Affairs Regulation No. 20/2018 regarding village financial management which was 
previously regulated in the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 113/2014. The 
village secretary currently acts as both the PPKD coordinator and the PTPKD in 
accordance with regulation No. 20/2018, with the treasury function carried out by the 
Head of Finance. The activity initially carried out by the Village Treasurer in the Barito 
Kuala Regency was appointed outside the structure of the Village Apparatus and divided 
into Asset and Goods Treasurers. The village officials and their family were also potential 
fraud perpetrators, which arises from the formation of an Activity Management Team by 
the Village Head. Based on Regional Head Regulations concerning Government 
Goods/Services Procurement Policy Institutions (LKPP) Number 22 of 2015 which was 
changed to 13/2013 concerning Guidelines for Procurement Procedures of Government 
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Goods and Services in the village, the Activity Management Team (TPK) is a team 
established by the village head in accordance with the services carried out by the 
government and community.  
 
Opportunity to commit fraud is created in the form of less strict regulations regarding 
those to be appointed as TPK members. According to a village official in Barito Kuala 
Regency (ID02, 2018) regulations need to be made clear, and chosen from the village 
community, to prevent the misinterpretation and to prevent unwanted attributes. This 
reinforces the regulations ambiguity governing the formation of the TPK team and 
causes misinterpretation. 
 
The potential fraud perpetrators are not only the Village Head rather they are also 
officials and their families. This is strengthened by the Indonesia Corruption Watch, 
(2018) research, which stated that all fraud cases involve the Village Head as the main 
actor, APD, and family. The Village Heads involved 112 (one hundred and twelve) 
people, which continues to increase significantly every year. A total of 15 (fifteen), 32, 
and 65 village heads were elected in 2015, 2016, and 2017. However, not all actors are 
Village Heads, therefore, there were 32 officials and three village head family (Indonesia 
Corruption Watch, 2017). 
 
This potential needs the preventive action and supervision of the community, therefore 
from the discussion of the Village Mid-Term Development Plan as well as the Village 
Income and Expenditure Budget, it is important to promote monitoring participation. 
Furthermore, there is a need for counter-hegemony in the power domination owned by 
the Village Government. According to Maslow, (1943), the assumption to achieve 
welfare by instilling power also needs to be straightened out because morals are more 
important in achieving common prosperity. 
 
Village Fund: Bring Welfare or Danger 
 
Village officials stated that the compensation received was still minimal and not in 
accordance with the risks received. Furthermore, at some levels, their salary is below 
the standard minimum wage. Therefore, based on the fact that APD is also a worker, 
everything refers to Indonesian Law Number 13 of 2003 concerning Manpower (2003). 
In Article 89, the minimum wage is defined as (1) the minimum wage based on the 
province or regency/city area and (2) minimum wage based on sector in the province or 
regency/ city. The following is an excerpt from one of the village officials. 
 
“At least, each level received compensation in accordance with the law, therefore, it does 
not a cause for the need to commit fraud”(ID02, 2018). 
 
A similar statement was also conveyed by the participants of the FGD regarding the 
Study of the Village Funds Utilization in South Kalimantan (2018)  
 
“Compensation for village officials is very minimal, therefore, they also need to benefit 
from the funds. The biggest benefit of village funds for officials is dealing with law 
enforcement officials (APH), which causes energy drain." (IK05, 2018)  
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Based on the motivation theory, namely the hierarchy of needs proposed by Maslow, 
(1943), workers basic needs, such as clothing, food, and shelter, need to be fulfilled in 
order to motivate them (Gitman et al., 2018). A person that works to fulfil the needs of 
others, is a public servant, and when their basic needs are not fulfilled, there is a 
potential for the occurrence of fraud. 
 
The preliminary interview carried out at the beginning of this study was in accordance 
with Kompak's (2016) research, which stated that the Village Government Apparatus is a 
part-time job, therefore, the parties involved need to be traders, company workers, 
farmers, etc (ID02, 2018). This is in accordance with law No.6 of 2014, which needs APD 
to work professionally and full time. The potential for fraud on village funds originates 
from the budget, as illustrated in the case that occurred in several villages in Barito 
Kuala Regency. Cases number 1 and 2 are associated with fraud committed by village 
heads' to enrich themselves, which is against the law. This is based on the inkracht 
decision No.8/pid.sus-tpk/2017/pn.bjm and Number 12/Pid.Sus-TPK/2019/PN. 
Furthermore, unsupervised budget planning leads to non-optimal implementation of the 
budget (SiLPA). These impacts cause potential fraud with the Village Fund, therefore, 
transparent, participatory and accountable budget management is the solution to the 
main problems of corruption cases in villages. Finally, special attention is needed for 





In conclusion, it is important to increase the remuneration received by the Village 
Apparatus (APD) as a driving factor in running village governance for proper funds 
management. The remuneration received, especially at the middle and low-level 
management, is still below the Regional/Provincial Minimum Wage (UMR/P). This tends 
to create new problems, that causes a pay gap in salary or remuneration among village 
officials. Furthermore, the APD minimum welfare is not in line with their responsibilities 
where they need to be professional in carrying out their duties.  
 
The main APD task is in village development, however, the compensation for the 
workload received is not proportional to the risks faced, therefore they experience a 
high risk with low return condition. In addition, the central and local governments tried 
to overcome the village fund fraud problem by increasing APD salaries and welfare. 
However, the increase was limited to the village head and secretary, while the head of 
affairs and division were still under the minimum wage (UMR). Therefore, based on 
these conditions, the strength of the new remuneration system in suppressing the fraud 
potential is still in doubt, with new loopholes or gap. In other words, this uneven APD 
remuneration increase becomes difficult to mitigate, and eliminate the potential in 
funds managed by APD. 
 
Other factors that cause fraud are the over power possessed by village top 
management, therefore, transparency is needed for participatory and accountable 
budget management. Furthermore, promoting community participatory efforts as a 
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form of counter-hegemony make the self-management principle to be achieved. This 
can also be a form of fraud mitigation, besides building the idea that power in top 
management is not meant to achieve mutual prosperity. 
 
The central and local governments need to respond to the differences in remuneration 
between the upper, middle, and lower levels of the village government apparatus (APD) 
because this creates a new gap that can lead to new problems, including potential fraud. 
Every APD is required to work full time, however the remuneration received is not full at 
the regional minimum wage (UMR) standard. Therefore, the government also need to 
mitigate fraud by building participatory public awareness and improving their 
remuneration.  
 
This research was carried out using a qualitative approach, thereby making it difficult for 
the results to be generalized to a broader scope. Research themes on fraud are sensitive 
in collecting data, this is because access is needed from credible external sources. 
Although not all fraud data was collected, an understanding of the data triangulation 
process helped to solve the problems. 
 
Further research needs to be carried out to determine the extent of the central and 
regional governments' response in overcoming the gaps in the asymmetric APD 
remuneration system. This is because others are still struggling to make themselves 
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